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Abstract
Attribute-based access control (ABAC) is a very powerful and flexible security technique
making it possible to overcome limitations of traditional role-based and discretionary access
controls. ABAC enables the dynamic handling of vast numbers of heterogeneous and
changing resources and users, a task especially relevant for E-Commerce or distributed
computing. With an authentication and authorisation infrastructure (AAI) in place, service
providers could benefit from synergies and outsourcing possibilities and, simultaneously,
strengthening their security level. In addition, AAIs could arbitrate between users’ privacy
issues and vendors’ information demands, using privacy enhancing technologies. However,
implementing ABAC is not trivial; nor is the derivation of attributes or metadata. This work
proposes a solution to the demands for privacy aware, usable, secure, and outsourceable ECommerce infrastructures with an AAI / ABAC combination. We introduce relevant
technologies and an implementation that is evaluated. The prototype is based on the Liberty
Alliance’s ID-FF system, using XACML elements and classification tools.
Keywords: IT Security, e-business Models, e-business Architectures & Technologies,

Authentication, Security Protocols, Access Control, Privacy

1 Introduction and motivation
In the changing environment of E-Commerce and distributed computing new demands on
infrastructures and service providing have developed. For Service Providers (SPs) these
demands include a higher level of security through fine grained access control and additional
information about customers and the reputation as well as the possibility to outsource
security services to 3rd party providers. Users require better usability with a Single Sign-On
(SSO), central maintenance of account data, and the possibility to prove reputation and
trustworthiness from one provider to another. Privacy protection has also become a major
concern. Traditional techniques and methods can not satisfy these demands.
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Of course, this list of user and provider demands is not complete. For an in depth discussion
of E-Commerce stakeholder’s demands see (Schläger et al. 2006) and (Schläger, Pernul
2005).

1.1 Service and security infrastructures for E-Commerce environments
At the dawn of E-Commerce only few providers offered services on the internet. Each
vendor developed and maintained its own proprietary software solution as an isolated
application. The main challenge then was to translate traditional brick-and-mortar business
to the internet. Today E-Commerce has become ubiquitous. One user is related to many
vendors and maintains numerous accounts and identities, each containing user profile data.
The challenge has shifted from mere technical problems to convincing product offerings and
diversified services in order to provide added value to customers in highly competitive
markets. The Internet serves as a new platform for business transactions. Securing these
transactions is crucial for E-Commerce providers (Katsikas et al. 2005).
Generally, we see contradictory requirements on E-Commerce servicing as depicted in
Figure 1. A suitable infrastructure for modern E-Commerce providing needs to mediate
between users and providers and offer sophisticated security and federation services.

USER DEMANDS
·

·

Ease of Use
Account management, Single
Sign-On, preference and
reputation sharing

Privacy
Pseudonymity, data canniness

PROVIDER DEMANDS
·

·

Security
fine grained access control,
expressive user attributes,
professional security management

Outsourcing
Federations, synergies,
professional third party services

Figure 1: User and provider demands

E-commerce vendors can rely on infrastructures supporting their business processes. This
can be extremely relevant for small and medium-sized companies not having the resources
or the knowledge to secure their business or to maintain data storage facilities for
sophisticated customer relationship management. In addition, these providers will especially
benefit from synergies resulting from a larger customer and information base in a federation.
Infrastructures could empower such a federation with complex, yet transparent to use,
technology improving e-business models, processes, and security for E-Commerce
providers.

1.2 Authentication and authorisation infrastructures (AAIs)
Known authorisation models for Access Control (AC) include discretionary (DAC),
mandatory (MAC), and role based access control (RBAC). A discretionary model is not
flexible enough for the changing portfolios and customer tailored resources or products
offered in E-Commerce environments. The mandatory AC model is favourable for military
purposes concentrating on information flow control making it inadequate for commercial
purposes. Nowadays, RBAC is state-of-the-art for business products. However, Internet and
E-Commerce environments lack a needed stable role structure. A permanent structure would
be against the nature of the ever-changing Web.
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Attribute-based access control (ABAC) is one of the latest developments in the field of
authorisation and access control. With XACML – the eXtensible Access Control Markup
Language (OASIS eXtensible Access Control Markup Language Technical Committee
2005) – an open standard has been proposed by the OASIS (Organization for the
Advancement of Structured Information Standards) that is able to express policies based on
classical access control models like role-based and discretionary access control (Priebe et al.
2004). XACML enables building complex policies that derive an access control decision
from object and subject attributes. This standard facilitates providing dynamic, flexible, and
fine-grained access control. An important standard for the exchange of security information
between service and identity providers is SAML – the Security Assertion Markup Language
(OASIS Security Services Technical Committee 2005) – also maintained by the OASIS
group.
Service providers on the Internet are familiar with infrastructures providing basic security
services. Authentication and Authorisation Infrastructures (AAIs) have started with basic
Single Sign-On functionality and are nowadays able to manage the authorisation process and
access control decisions. Two main architectures can be found: central ones like PAPI
(Castro-Rojo, López 2001) or Microsoft’s .NET Passport solution (Microsoft Inc. 2003) or
federated ones like Liberty’s Identity Federation Framework (Liberty ID-FF) (Cantor, Kemp
2005) or Internet2’s Shibboleth (Cantor 2004).
AAIs help sharing security information about subjects and objects with other SPs or central
services. Such information could be an assertion about the user’s correct identification and
authentication. Additionally, trusted sources can provide profile information. Using these
attributes an access control model like ABAC (e.g., using XACML) can decide on the user’s
rights. Figure 2 shows the process of granting access to resources with the help of user,
environment, and resource attributes.

Figure 2: Attribute infrastructure security services

Attributes can contain identity and profile information. Despite this information’s usefulness
for access control, the user’s privacy needs to be respected as well. To mediate between
providers’ wishes and users’ demands trusted parties are needed, filtering or aggregating
attributes. Aggregation or classification of attributes is a recognised privacy enhancing
technology (PET) (Federrath 2005), additionally providing efficient ways to exchange data.
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1.3 Enabling E-Commerce with attribute-based access control and AAIs
This work presents a combination of Authorisation and Authentication Infrastructures with
attribute-based access control and privacy enhancing technologies. We suggest a new
protocol and architecture to address the given problems. A prototype has been implemented,
making it possible to evaluate the proposal.
Although AAIs are per se generic architectures, the term E-Commerce throughout the paper
is used meaning business-to-consumer transactions (B2C E-Commerce). When talking about
users a client e.g. a private customer is meant. The term Service Provider refers to vendors.

2 Related work and relevant technologies
AAIs make it possible to combine service outsourcing strategies with strengthened security.
A special benefit lies in the accumulated user data over a federation: user profiles, buying
patterns, and earned privileges. Identities can be transferred from one service provider to
another making it possible to always use up-to-date address data or proof a good reputation
acquired at one federation member. Comparative surveys on existing AAIs can be found in
(Lopez et al. 2004) and (Schläger, Pernul 2005). Pfitzmann (Pfitzmann 2003) has analysed
privacy issues in the Liberty ID-FF protocol and presented several enhancements. The idea
of outsourcing non-functional tasks has been discussed in the field of software engineering
(see e.g. Tanenbaum, Steen 2002).
(Katsikas et al. 2005) sum up requirements in providing secure E-Commerce. The shown
need for flexible and dynamic access control in E-Commerce can be addressed with ABAC
as presented in (Priebe et al. 2006) or (Yuan, Tong 2005). The basic idea is not to define
permissions directly between subjects and objects, but instead to use their attributes as the
basis for authorisations. For subjects, attributes can be static or dynamic. Age, current
location or an acquired subscription for a digital library could be used as well.
Subjects and objects are both represented by a set of attributes and related attribute values.
Permissions are defined between subject and object descriptors which consist of sets of
attributes, conditions, and an operation that is to be executed. Environment attributes like
time of day can be considered for the access control decision as well (Priebe et al. 2006).
Several techniques have already been mentioned in the cause of the introduction. To enable
attribute-based access control the open standard XACML 2.0 (OASIS eXtensible Access
Control Markup Language Technical Committee 2005) can be used. XACML has been
applied with great success for implementations of ABAC. As XACML is agnostic to the
exchange of attributes an adequate approach is needed. With SAML an open standard exists
providing an XML-based protocol to transfer attributes (OASIS Security Services Technical
Committee 2005). The integration of SAML with XACML has been proposed by (Anderson,
Lockhart 2005).

2.1 SAML
SAML is an XML-based standard to describe security information which is communicated
between system entities and domains. It defines the syntax of assertions about a subject and
the processing semantics of these assertions. There are three different kinds of information
which can be communicated with SAML: Authentication information, attribute information,
and authorisation information. It can be used to provide requested assertions, authenticate
subjects, and return the resulting assertion and perform a complete Single Sign-On and
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single logout process. In the assertion and the protocol definition are extension points
declared to integrate additional functionality which is not covered by the SAML standard.

2.2 XACML
XACML is an XML-based standard to describe attribute-based authorisation rules and
policies. Furthermore, it specifies rules to process and combine these authorisation rules and
policies. XACML enables authorisation processes with fine granularity. XACML is based on
rules which can be specified with the element <Rule>. A <Rule> has an attribute Effect. The
value of Effect can be “Permit” or “Deny”. Rules can be aggregated to policies and policies
to policy sets.
A policy is defined with the element <Policy>. A rule-combining algorithm specifies how to
evaluate several rules and how to treat different effects of rules in one policy. The resulting
granularity and flexibility make XACML especially useful in changing, flexible, and
heterogeneous environments.
A policy enforcement point (PEP) is the interface between resource and subject. It performs
the access control for the resource. If the access requester (the subject) wants to access the
resource the PEP forwards this request to the policy decision point. The request can contain
additional attributes for subject, resource, kind of access and environment. The Policy
Decision Point (PDP) computes the decision whether the subject gets access or not. For that
purpose it requests additional attributes from the policy information point (PIP). The PIP
retrieves these attributes and passes them back to the PDP. Now the PDP evaluates the
policies and policy sets it got from the policy administration point (PAP) when it was
initialised and sends the response to the PEP. The PEP permits or denies access for the
subject to the resource depending on the response. Additionally it processes the actions
stated in the <obligation> element of <Rule> or <Policy>. As the XACML standard does not
consider distributed environments or scattered attribute bases, it needs adaptation for AAIs.

2.3 Resulting technical requirements for AAIs
Based on the mentioned SAML and XACML functionalities and entities an appropriate AAI
needs to support four steps or sub-services. Figure 3 shows their interaction.
Authentication
Assertion

Attribute
Assertion

Policy Decision
Assertion

Policy
Enforcement

Figure 3: SAML/XACML services for ABAC in AAIs

In the easiest case the infrastructure provides only Single Sign-On. This would be done by
giving out an assertion about correct authentication on a subject. Combining this step with
the next sub-service the AAI covers the transfer of attributes about users and resources. This
could be implemented as interfaces which allow a resource to query a user’s home domain
about his or her attributes using SAML. Even more powerful are AAIs which can even come
to a decision regarding a user’s access request and then forward this decision to the resource.
Finally, with the fourth and last sub-service, it is possible that the AAI enforces the decision
by itself by installing a proxy system in between the client and the resource.
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2.4 Lessons from existing AAIs
Various AAIs are available on the market, accessible as frameworks, products, or mere
concepts. Among evaluated systems were Microsoft’s .NET Passport, the Identity Federation
and Web Service Frameworks from Liberty Alliance, Internet2’s Shibboleth, the Spanish
PAPI system, the privilege management infrastructures (PMIs) PERMIS and AKENTI, as
well as Grid AAIs like CARDEA, CAS, GridShib, and VOMS. The detailed analysis can be
found in (Lopez et al. 2004), (Schläger, Pernul 2005), and (Schläger et al. 2006). All
solutions have a SSO functionality in common. However, neither of them is able to provide
ABAC. At most, attribute exchange is supported. The implementation of SAML within
Liberty’s ID-FF and Shibboleth is exemplary for an open AAI. Grid systems and PMIs have
developed means to compute an access control decision for the enquiring service. An
enforcement of this AC decision is only realised by PAPI. PAPI resembles a proxy system
covering the whole communication process between client and vendor. From an architectural
point of view the adversaries .NET Passport and Liberty’s ID-FF show the extremes of a
centralised versus a federated infrastructure. When delegating security services to an AAI,
the decision has to be taken for each module whether to centralise this service or provide it
in a distributed manner. For more information on the consequences of allocation issues in
AAIs and the resulting impact on functionalities and privacy see (Schläger, Ganslmayer
2007).

2.5 Privacy enhancing technologies
A common definition of privacy has been given by Alan Westin (Westin 1967): “Privacy is
the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and
to what extent information about them is communicated to others.” When talking about
privacy on the Internet, we usually mean informational privacy, which can be defined as
“Self-determination of what information is known about a person and how it is used”
(Schläger, Pernul 2005).
In (Federrath 2005) Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET) are presented that try to
guarantee confidentiality when using Internet-based communication. They can be defined as
technologies minimising or avoiding personal data as well as safeguarding lawful processing
of data. PETs aim at hiding the user’s identity, making his actions unobservable to others
and try to provide an unlinkability of user actions. They explicitly do not trust network
operators or a single centralised station. From the privacy demands we have deducted three
main functionalities for our ABAC enabled AAIs.
- First of all identity and privileges need to be separated.
- Secondly, data gained in the process of access needs to be stored in a distributed manner.
Involved parties should use and gain as little information as possible.
- Finally, the user mustn’t be forced to trust a predefined identity provider but should rather
be able to choose among various providers the one of his liking.

3 Design goals for ABAC-enabled AAIs
This works proposed a new AAI concept integrating functionalities of ABAC based on open
standards, mediating between user and provider demands in E-Commerce environments. We
have shown that ABAC is preferable to other AC models for this scenario. With XACML we
try to add ABAC functionalities to AAIs using an open and approved standard. Open issues
with XACML for distributed usage have to be solved. The question of attribute information
origin and privacy will be addressed with PETs. The following paragraphs summarise
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findings of the analysis of open standards, PETs, and existing AAIs and formulate design
goals for the proposed architecture in section 4.

3.1 Elements of XACML and SAML
PEP – Policy Enforcement Point. Naturally, the PEP is closely connected with the SP. It is
at this point where the final access control functionality takes place. The PEP could be
realised as a proxy between user and vendor. However, the resulting bottleneck and the
restrictions of a generic solution argue against a centralised approach. Furthermore,
enforcing security decision outside the target application neglects inherent information about
the application. For fine-grained access control the application’s context must be
incorporated.
PDP – Policy Decision Point. For the PDP the benefits of maintaining the decision process
centrally have to be evaluated versus being a single-point-of-failure. We argue that for a
given number of PEPs we need one PDP to guarantee performance and still use the benefits
of maintaining it centrally. Following the arguments given in the introduction a local PDP is
neither useful from a software engineering nor from an economical point of view.
PIP – Policy Information Point. The Policy Information Point gathers all relevant attributes
for subjects, objects, and the environment. It is possible to assign a PDP one or more PIPs.
The PIP communicates with the relevant attribute authorities collecting attributes that are
then forwarded to the PDP. We see a need to integrate at least two PIPs into an access
control decision. The PDP should make use of his own PIP collecting resource and
environmental attributes. Another PIP is needed to perform the categorisation of user
attributes. This needs to be done by a trusted authority. In our approach we have decided on
the IdP to accumulate and categorise user data.
PAP – Policy Administration Point. In order to realise multi-layer policy architecture
merging centrally stored high level policies with locally maintained low level policies the
PAP needs to be able to derive policies from all service providers. The combined policies are
loaded by the PDP at start-up. Centrally maintained PDPs should each have their own PAP.
SAML – SAML Assertions are responsible for the users’ SSO. As an open standard it is
predetermined to form the underlying communication technology for every open AAI
approach. Its potential to sign, encrypt, and communicate any kind of attributes builds the
basis for XACML decisions.

3.2 Attribute infrastructure
XACML distinguishes three classes of attributes: subject attributes (user), object attributes
(resource), and environmental attributes. In our infrastructure the subject attributes are
collected by the chosen IdP. Resource attributes and general environmental attributes are
managed by the PDP’s PIP. With this separation the SP is protected from revealing resource
information to other members or competitors and the user can chose his most trusted IdP.
The SP is supposed to use opaque and changing IDs for his products. The process of
accumulating user attributes by the IdP is shown in Figure 4 using SAML/XACML
nomenclature. The IdP queries each SP if attributes about the identified user are available
(step 1). If applicable the SP answers with a token (step 2).
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(4) <AttributeQuery>
Resource

PDP
PIP

(4) <AttributeQuery>
Environment

IdP

(3)
<AuthzDecisionRequest>
(4) <AttributeQuery> User
AA
(5)
Account
Account Data+
Data
User Attributes

- Remove
SP identifier
- categorise
user

PIP

SP-1
(1) <AttributeQuery>

AA

(2)

SP-n

User Attributes
(SP1)

(1) <AttributeQuery>

AA

(2)

User Attributes
(SPn)

Figure 4: Collecting distributed attributes in a federation

The IdP uses the user’s implicit profile information to complement the explicitly given
account data. The request for a policy decision <AuthzDecisionQuery> (step 3) is send to the
PDP which will request all three kinds of attributes from the IdP’s PIP as well as from his
own PIP managing resource and environmental attributes (steps marked with 4). After the
decision is computed, it is send back to the requestor - the IdP (step 5).

3.3 Enhancing ABAC with attribute categorization

Access Control Expressiveness

Data stored about the user can be classified in three levels, shown in Figure 5. A pseudonym
is used as an identifier or Distinguished Name (DN). Adding to this pseudonym personal
data like email address, true name, or shipping address a user can be associated with his true
identity, regardless of the chosen DN. This data is given explicitly by the user and needs to
be maintained. Even more information about the user is stored in his profile. The profile
combines DN, explicitly given account data, and derived information from the users
shopping patterns, payment history, or behaviour. This information can be called reputation.
Please note, that in an open scenario, like E-Commerce, the notion of bad reputation is not
feasible. Users behaving intentionally untrustworthy will not let this information be
exchanged between SPs. They might simply apply for a new account.

Implicit and Inferred Data
e.g. User Behaviour, Credibility,
Purchase Pattern,
Interests, etc.

Profile

Explicitly given Data
e.g. eMail, Address, Age,
Sex, Location, Role
Memberships,
Institution, etc.

Account
Identifier
(Username,
PW)

Distinguish
ed Name

Figure 5: Attribute classes in AAIs and their Expressiveness
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In section 2.5 we have argued for distributed storage, data canniness, and user privacy. By
nature, the idea of computing access control decisions based on attributes that contain user
patterns and behaviour, reputation, and other personal profile data is in contrast with privacy
issues. For our architecture we have implemented a distributed decision making process
splitting and dividing information over different parties. Only in the unlikely case that the
whole system and all members are compromised the users’ complete profile information is
accessible. Furthermore, user profile data is filtered.
Although explicit user data is available through Customer Relationship Management (CRM)
systems, it is sufficient to communicate relevant information only. A summary of different
approaches to share trust and reputation in E-Commerce environments can be found in
(Jøsang et al. 2005). For the prototype we adapted a simple trust management solution: We
categorise business transactions into five different classes. We assume the members of a
federation have agreed on general and binding processes to derive these classes from their
CRM system. The categorisation is given in Table 1.
Exchanging user classifications rather then exhaustive buying patterns is also reasonable
from a performance point of view. Furthermore, the classification of data enables SPs to
define access policies much easier.
Table 1: Proposed user categories for reputation sharing
Category

Origin

No data or insufficient data about the user, no
categorization is possible.
Standard Data about the user is stored and was processed; no
categorization for a special reputation or privileges could be
made or the user opted against it.
Recent business transactions have been completed
Bronze
satisfyingly over all.
Business transactions have been completed satisfyingly
Silver
over a longer period of time.
All recorded business transactions have been completed
Gold
satisfyingly. The data stems from a longer period of time
and from numerous transactions.

Effect

Null

The attribute issuer would
grant no additional
privileges.
The issuer would grant
minor privileges.
The issuer would grant
some privileges.
The issuer would grant
full privileges.

With the proposed classification the PDP can evaluate the AC decision based on user
attributes from his account (especially age, origin, and roles are important e.g. to comply
with local legal regulations), his reputation status in the federation, environmental attributes
from the accessed SP, and attributes describing the resource. Note that we have succeeded in
separating subject and object identities from privileges to compute this decision. The PDP is
not aware who accesses what.

4 Proposed protocol and implementation
For our prototype we made use of the main elements of Liberty ID-FF 1.1, namely
distributed identity and service providers, and used SAML 1.0. The first step of the access
control decision – the authentication – is handled as defined by the Liberty ID-FF protocol.
In addition to these parties we introduce the XACML elements PIP, PAP, PDP, PEP, and a
classification tool – the categoriser. As the XACML standard is very imprecise about the PIP
we decided on using the PIP concept mainly as an interface on relevant databases and a as
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transformation tool of information and attributes into SAML. The originally proposed
Context Handler has been substituted by this functionality. Figure 6 shows our ABACenabled AAI in a sequence diagram. The graph is in accordance with the UML 2.0 notation
using SAML and XACML nomenclature. On top of the sequence we have included the
information gained by the involved parties about the transaction in the process. Note that this
process is generic. The requested resource can be any good, digital, or Grid computing
service.
Information gained
in the process

User

Who - Attributes ü
What - Attributes ü
AC Result: ü

Who ü Attributes ü
What - Attributes AC Result: ü

IdP

AC Decision Point
PDP

PAP

AuthN

PIP

Who (ü) Attributes (ü)
What ü Attributes ü
AC Result: ü

SP-1
PIP

Cat.
PIP

Who (ü) Attributes (ü)
What - Attributes AC Result: -

SP-2
PEP

Cat.
PIP

SP-n
PEP

Cat.
PIP

PEP

Request Resource
SAML AuthnRequest, XACML AuthzDecisionQuery

Request Authentication
Authenticate

SAML
AttributeQuery
(User)

XACML AuthzDecisionQuery,
SAML AttributeStatement
SAML
AttributeQuery
SAML
AttributeStatement

Categoriser

SAML
Attribute
Statement
SAML AttributeQuery (User)
SAML AttributeStatement
SAML AttributeQuery (User)
SAML AttributeStatement

SAML AttributeQuery (Res, Environment)
SAML AttributeStatement

XACML AuthzDecisionStatement

SAML AuthnStatement, XACML AuthzDecisionStatement

Figure 6: ABAC-enabled AAI prototype – sequence diagram

When the user tries to access a resource he is referred to his IdP. The IdP is derived either
from a cookie stored in the user’s browser or the user chooses from a list. This is the
standard Liberty ID-FF SSO procedure. The SP (SP-1 in Figure 6) sends the IdP a SAML
authentication request <AuthnRequest>. Additionally, he sends an XACML authorisation
decision request, forwarding with it his identifier, a random, opaque user identifier, and a
random, opaque resource identifier.
After the user is authenticated at his IdP the XACML component of the IdP – its PIP –
collects all user profile attributes. Every SP in the federation is asked about user attributes.
These attributes will be classified in one of the five groups according to Table 1. After the
PIP has collected all attributes (respectively the categorisations) their weighted value is
calculated into one category. For our prototype this is just the average of all attributes.
However, it is feasible to weight stronger classifications that have been derived over a longer
period of time or consist of more business transactions. Adding account data to the
classification the IdP can now send an AC decision request to the PDP with the identifier of
the requested resource and all relevant user attributes. The PDP’s PIP will collect resource
and environment attributes. It is important that the SP’s environment is used. For example
for special offers with a specific deadline the time zone of the SP needs to be used. The time
zone might be differing from the PDP’s server. The AC decision is computed using the
loaded policies. For our prototype simple policies have been generated to prove our concept.
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However, it is possible to use fine grained access control policies. The decision is send back
to the requesting entity – the IdP. The SAML authentication statement and the XACML
authorisation decision statement are referred back to the SP using the same communication
channel as before. Although, Web Services could be used via the Liberty WSF we stay with
Http Post requests at this stage. Such incremental developments will be applied in the next
circle of enhancements. Finally, a local PEP at the SP will enforce the decision.
After the access request is terminated we find various data objects from this transaction at
the various parties. Starting with the SP in question (SP-1) he knows what has been accessed
in this transaction and the used attributes. He was asked by the IdP to provide the user
classification. However, as in reality multiple requests will be made he should not be able to
connect user identity and resource request. The only data he knows about the user is data
already existing in his CRM. The brackets in Figure 6 symbolise this peculiarity. Naturally,
the SP also knows about the outcome of the decision. Please note that, through the usage of
opaque IDs, he gains no information about the user’s identity via the SAML Authentication
Assertion.
All other service providers know that a user has requested a resource in the federation.
However, no further data is generated with the request.
The IdP knows who accesses a resource and his account data. Furthermore he gets informed
about his classification or categorisation at the federation members and the outcome of the
decision. We strongly recommend that a user can choose between various providers finding
the one he trusts most due to the personal information aggregated at this point. Despite this
recommendation our prototype right now features only one IdP. The policy decision point
computes his decision only based upon the subject and object attributes. He is neither aware
of the identity of the requestor nor of the product in question. Naturally he knows the
decision.
For the implementation the SSO functionality of Liberty’s ID-FF was used. For the XACML
components we have started with SUN’s XACML reference implementation changing and
adopting where necessary. The classification is based on a simple Java-based computation.
The classification will be developed to a rule-based service in the future. The existing
implementation has also pointed to various issues of compatibility.

5 Conclusion
ABAC and AAIs are able to provide security services well suited for E-Commerce if
combined logically and fostered on the appropriate technologies. The paper examined
various architectural and technological models for AAIs. In addition to open standards, the
proposed approach especially respects privacy demands. The given prototype is the
consequence of the combination and adaptation of the open standards SAML and XACML
with AAIs and privacy enhancing technologies. We present – to our knowledge – for the first
time a holistic solution for secure service providing with attribute-based access control in a
service oriented infrastructure. Our protocol successfully mediates between provider and
user demands. This is achieved through the integration of attribute infrastructures into AAIs
to gain additional functionalities. With the introduced solution, service providers and
especially small and midsized vendors can outsource services to the infrastructure and gain
new functionalities for their business processes.
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From a privacy perspective, we have succeeded in separating identity and privileges by
introducing a categorisation mechanism that maps privacy-critical account data to reputation
categories. The distribution of services and information leads to a minimum of required trust.
The architecture is flexible enough to avoid the necessity of forced trust relationships for the
user. For service providers, the proposed holistic approach to cover the entire security chain
by implementing ABAC AAIs with PETs reduces threats and makes access control
transparent for SPs. The usage of open standards and open formats avoids patchwork
security for the federation.
The current proof-of-concept prototype will be enhanced to support SAML 2.0. With this
update strong communication security based on a PKI will be introduced. Furthermore, the
communication between servers will be enhanced to use Web Service standards.
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